

## Chapter 29 : The true nature of monarchy

*When the arguments are weak,  
raise your voice.*

Samuel Johnson (1709-1784)

As depicted in the introduction (see introduction 2), the Social Democratic Party leadership was very grateful that Gustaf V did not try to oppose the system change. Labour historian John Lindgren (1955) describes Hjalmar Brantings & Per Albin Hansson's lack of interest in the republican issue as a combination of good cooperation with the royal house, lack of political support for the abolition of the monarchy & that social democracy had enough of other problems. The chaos of the Weimar republic deterred & Hitler was on the horizon.

I can testify from my own experience about the devastating repercussions of Nazism on the interest in a republican form of government among young Swedish workers. During the first years of the 1930s, we at Brunnsvik folk high school used to discuss the alternatives monarchy or republic. I remember this as a number of lively and refreshing speech exercises - as a means of combating the then current rural dullness they deserve a high mark. In 1933 the curtain descended on our pleasant bouts. They stopped altogether. It was because of the obvious betrayal of democracy committed by President Paul von Hindenburg on the day he entrusted Hitler with the Chancellor's post. The following year, the president passed away and Hitler took over the powers of head of state. We thought it was pointless to whine any longer about our own adaptable monarchy. We were not alone in this view. As a reflection of the disastrous and threatening developments in Germany, many convinced republicans found reason to reconsider their previous views on the monarchy.

And thus the native hue of resolution  
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.<sup>1</sup>

Social democracy then entered into coalition with the Bondeförbundet (the Peasants' League), Sweden's most monarchic party. No time for anti-monarchic agitation then either. From 1934 to 1957 there were no republican motions.

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After the war, the Republican discussions began. The youth organization (SSU), the women's association (SSKF), the educational association (ABF), the trade union movement (LO), the social democracy's own think-tank (Tiden), independent think-tanks (Clarté), the liberal press (Dagens Nyheter) & independent academics. The discussions will be somewhat easier to follow if you distinguish between Republicans, anti-monarchists and anti-fascists. I follow the SSU track:

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### A. SWEDEN'S SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC YOUTH LEAGUE (SSU)

Branting's politics can be described as choosing parliamentary democracy with a politically neutral king (the English 1689 model) in 1917 rather than a republic based on popular

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<sup>1</sup> Lindgren 1955: ss. 56-57.

power (the French 1789 model). However, the youth league held on to its Republican ideals of 1789. Lindblom (1945) describes the climate of ideas as:

“They dreamt of a revolutionary war of freedom, they were inspired by the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. Robespierre, Danton and Marat were great heroes. ... The socialist knowledge was drawn partly from the writings of Marx and Lasalle, which were not studied in too much detail, and partly from Krapotkin, where the anarchist ideas came from. In the field of fiction, Strindberg was the idol, he was read almost as the Bible, and further Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Max Nordau, Zola, Lamartine, Ibsen and others. This inclination towards literary exercises may have been an expression of a sense of a lacking a political purpose. They were not allowed real responsibility in the political feuds, as the party did not take them seriously enough.”<sup>2</sup>

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The 1950 succession and the constitutional investigation (1954-1964) activated SSU. The writings about the so-called Haijby affair seem to have contributed. A lot then happened quickly. In 1954, the Republican issue was included in SSU's program & the 1955 Congress decided to make the 1911 Republican demand a priority. In 1955 and 1956, the Republican issue was included in ABF's course offerings.<sup>3</sup>

In 1955, the Republican club was constituted with the ABF-employee etc. Hans Haste as chairman, Sven Österberg as vice chairman & Ingemar Wassberg as treasurer; Vilhelm Moberg (SAC?), Herbert Tingsten (fp) & August Spångberg (s) were poster names. In the wake of the approximately 300 ABF courses, another 20 clubs formed spread across the country. These were gathered under the umbrella organization the Republican League with Sten Sjöberg (s) as chairman, Haste as vice chairman & Ingemar Mundebo (fp) as secretary.

ABF's study material included a “Social Democratic“ bibliography (see below). To this can be added a Swedish republican tradition 1848-1918.<sup>4</sup> The main focus of the bibliography was on the constitutional conflict 1906-1918 and Gustaf V's diplomatic initiative during the 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, especially the midsummer crisis of 1941.

- The Social Democratic Party Program.
- Brusewitz, Axel. (1951.) Kungamakt, herremakt, folkmakt : Författningskampen i Sverige (1906-1918). Stockholm: Tidens förlag.
- Wigforss, Ernst. (1954.) Minnen, del 3 : 1932-1949. Stockholm: Tidens förlag. [Sidorna 153-157,170-177.]
- Sjöberg, Sten. Demokrati och monarki. Fackföreningsrörelsen, 1952: nr 51-52, ss. 508-516.
- Sjöberg, Sten. Konung kontra statsråd under Gustaf V:s regeringstid. Tidskriften Tiden, 1954: nr 9, ss. 520-531.

ABF's course activities were very extensive, so their study material on monarchy-republic<sup>5</sup>, especially in Vilhelm Moberg's interpretation<sup>6</sup>, long time dominated the debate. The study

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<sup>2</sup> Lindblom 1945: ss. 14-15.

<sup>3</sup> Sjöberg 1955.

<sup>4</sup> Spångberg 1966: ss. 45-48; Sjöberg & Åsard 1982; Lundberg 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Eliasson 1954: ss. 28-35.

<sup>6</sup> Moberg 1953 & 1955.

material had the dual purpose of both describing the “true nature of the monarchy“ and convincing the students that the 1911 republican demands were still good politics. As depicted in the next chapter 30, however, it was difficult to get the message across outside SSU & LO. It was perceived as too biased. It was also this with the movement's fixation on Gustaf V as a person.

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The Republican issue was discussed at SSU's congresses 1955-1967. Most speakers called for more socialist orthodoxy, more energy in the agitation & a referendum which the SSU board found both naive and counterproductive in view of the state of opinion. If you're a minority, you're a minority. No more republic if the motion is defeated both in the Parliament & in a referendum! Instead, the SSU board recommended interested parties to apply to the Republican Club, which would act as a “safety valve“ & alibi (see next chapter 30).

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## B. THE TRUE NATURE OF THE MONARCHY

The monarchy debate is very diverse. Since the writings vary between analysis of the role of monarchy in society, defamation of the royal house and pure fantasy, it is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction. Media research is therefore more concerned with discourses or “stories“ than actual facts. Some of these discourses are:

- The family version of dad, mom & kids in all stages of life. (Chapters 20, 34 & Appendix 3.)
- You cannot separate country from constitution. Sweden without a monarchy is no longer Sweden. (Chapter 6.)
- The Monarchy's Contribution to Sweden's Image abroad & to GDP. (Chapters 16 & 17.)
- The pornographic version about mistresses, prostitutes & coffee girls. (Online appendices A & B.)
- The Republic is man's development from subject to citizen. (Chapter 1.)
- The Royal house abusing its position. (Chapters 18, 26, 27, etc.)
- The Royal Family as friends of Germany, Nazis and traitors. (Section C, below)
- The Royal Family as friends of Islamic dictators. (Chapters 17 and 18.)

The republican debate (to be distinguished from pure anti-monarchism) has always in the end been about the constitution & civic spirit, not about the individual Bernadotte's character or lack thereof. It has therefore been difficult for the Republicans to exploit slander & fantasy versions in their propaganda. They despise the family version, consider the monarchy's contribution to GDP as minimal, ignore the pornography and are otherwise ambivalent. Their main current argument is the monarchy abusing its position, so that the Bernadotte are assumed to both dompt & dupe their surroundings (Moberg), to run errand for the upper class (Sjöberg) & in various ways enrich themselves (Lyrevik). The message of the royal house as tyrant lovers seems to have lost ground in recent years, but is still quoted in anti-fascist circles as bible words. The message of Republic as personal liberation is difficult to get across since it assumes that the population is both enslaved and misled. Not so popular. The population would rather be flattered. It has also been difficult to assert republic & people

power as an alternative historiography. The monarchy is better documented. But that seems to be changing. Monarchy is to be eliminated from history.

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The subject of pornography is a delicate one, as the Republicans are keen to present themselves as purer in spirit than they are. "Taking the moral high ground" as the Americans put it. Anti-monarchic agitation, however, has always been a mixture of sex & politics. I'll give you the example from "The Reluctant Monarch":

"The Christian Democrat Peter Althin, 2009-2013 chairman of the Republican Association, says that before the publication he was contacted by both Deanne Rauscher and Kristoffer Lind at Lind & Co and read the raw script about the king's private life. Mona Abou-Jeib Broshammar, the then Secretary General of the Association, confirms that she arranged a collaboration with the publishing house [so that the association's members could buy the book at a reduced price] because, according to her, it was in the Republican Association's interest to reach out with the book to as many people as possible. She also says that she had discussions with Thomas Sjöberg about him campaigning on behalf of the association, but that Sjöberg wanted to keep a low profile."<sup>7</sup>

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#### C.THE ROYAL HOUSE AS FRIENDS OF GERMANY, NAZIS & TRAITORS

*To be SSU in the thirties is to be anti-Nazi.*  
SSU 100 years (anniversary book)

Since fascism/Nazism are republican movements, it seems in retrospect strange that they have been associated with monarchy. The reason seems to be that the Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini after his notorious march on Rome in 1922, by the then king Viktor Emanuel was appointed to form a government because the Fascists were seen as the only realistic counterforce against the country's socialist insurgents. Also Hitler wanted to use the appeal of the monarchy, and at the beginning of his rule he called himself temporary regent. Further fascists such as the Hungarian Miklós Horthy and the Spanish Francisco Franco also presented themselves as monarchists.

The English left interpreted this as monarchy & fascism/Nazism being politically related and since there was no rational reason for the working class to support them there must be some irrational reason. The options become a list of everything that the academic left at this time despised: Ignorance, celebrity culture, magical thinking, religion, nationalism & the subconscious. I refer to Olechnowicz (2011 & 2018).

The Swedish left seems to have had a more stringent political science approach to fascism. The early definition of fascism was that it pursued a strong state, a strong defence & strong cohesion. The Head of State had a lifelong tenure & ruled through decree. The difference vis-a-vis monarchy was in the movements culture and social base. Fascism was millenarian & popular, while monarchy was conservative & elite. – The modern definition is that neo-fascists, neo-Nazis & ultra-nationalists all are right-wing extremists having in common that

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<sup>7</sup> Harrison & Schein 2012: ss. 158-159.

they pursue an ethnically pure state, which according to them can be accomplished through a democratic form of government. (See Lööw 1990; Deland m fl. red. 2010; Petersson 2015; m fl.)

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SSU had almost from the start in 1920s a self-imposed role as a defenders of democracy, including ideological resistance and streetfighting. The main opponents were the business and peasant right-wings and from 1932 also Nazi groups.<sup>8</sup> Gustaf V, heir Prince Gustaf Adolf & his wife Sibylle were already regarded as Nazi sympathizers or worse, which seems to have been due to their political activism, German family, social life & representation. However, the bibliography in section A of this chapter sheds little light on what actually took place. Possibly Gustaf V could be accused of exceeding his mandate, heir Prince Gustaf Adolf of bad judgment & Sibylle of an unpropitious fate. As she said herself: “Not only have the Nazis destroyed my German life - now they have done the same in Sweden.”<sup>9</sup>

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### Gustaf V

Gustaf V's popularity and reputation has varied widely. I summarize: During the pre-war period 1907-1914, he pursued his opponents (republicans, trade unionists, socialists, conscientious objectors, blasphemers & Lèse-majesté). During the inter-war period 1918-1939 he worked actively to restore his popularity & tarnished reputation, and during the Second World War probably became Sweden's most popular regent ever. During the post-war period 1945-1950 and onwards, however, his opponents subjected him to an unprecedented smear campaign where he was portrayed as both cuckold, fornicator & homosexual Nazi.

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Gustaf V met Hitler three times. The first time was April 21, 1933. Gustaf was passing through and was to meet President Hindenburg for a lunch call at the Swedish Berlin Embassy. At the same time, he wanted to criticize the German leadership for the persecution of the Jews - through his brother Carl, chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, he was carefully informed about what was going on - and therefore asked Hindenburg to take some of his government colleagues with him. Those who accompanied Hindenburg was the newly appointed Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Vice Chancellor von Papen, Foreign Minister von Neurath, former Imperial President Simon and Prussian Academy President von Schillings.<sup>10</sup> No minutes were kept of Gustaf's “table talk“ but at least Hitler was allegedly very upset. Jarl Torbacke has compiled what we know. The versions are partly contradictory. I present the version that Gustaf the following month gave to the State Councillor Felix Hamrin:

“The exchange of words began, according to what the king now announced to Hamrin, with his majesty stating that he had always been a friend of Germany; This was precisely why he disapproved of the new regime's actions, which meant that Germany lost all sympathies from all peoples. Hitler answered that he must supplant the Jews, who had attained too much power; the few Jews who had been killed must

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<sup>8</sup> Lundin 2019.

<sup>9</sup> Roger Lundgren. Prinsessan Sibylla – ett kungligt livsöde. Kungliga magasinet, 2013:1.

<sup>10</sup> Dagens Nyheter 1933-04-22, s. 8.

moreover be put against the hundreds of people murdered by the Jews Communist accomplices. The King then appealed to Hitler to proceed with more discrimination.”<sup>11</sup>

Hitler's version of the meeting is from a table conversation in 1942:

“It had not always been easy to persuade the old gentleman [Hindenburg], but once you managed to convince him, he fully endorsed the matter. In the beginning, he had hardly wanted to know of any action against the Jews. However, at a lunch at the Swedish legation where we both participated, and the Swedish king had criticized the German Jewish measures, the old gentleman with his deep serious voice had rejected the remarks on the grounds that they were internal German matters which concerned only the German Chancellor.”<sup>12</sup>

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Gustaf's actions during World War II were almost identical to his actions during World War I. A mix of public statements & personal diplomacy. Like World War I, the Nordic heads of state came together to assure each other of mutual solidarity. Gustaf, Haakon VII, Christian X, the President of Finland and the foreign ministers met at Stockholm Castle October 18-19, 1939. Gustaf wanted to present something concrete and on October 10 sent Sven Hedin as diplomatic envoy to Hitler to investigate the possibility of a peace congress. Germany had attacked Poland but further actions were delayed & Gustaf thought there was a possibility to get the parties to the negotiating table. He thought wrong though. Hitler very kindly received Hedin but declined the proposal, which he considered hopeless.<sup>13</sup>

June 17, 1940, after the English defeat at Dunkirk, Gustaf made another attempt, this time via official channels. Hitler thanked him for the offer, but declined a second time. The English replied in mid-August, but they also said no. Gustaf's programmatic pacifism was met with contempt. Churchill's comment: “I should perhaps add that the involvement of the despicable Swedish King, after abandoning both Finland and Norway and entirely being in the grip of the Germans, may contain some encouraging aspects, although it as a whole leaves a bad aftertaste.” Nevertheless, Gustaf did not give up hope of averting a war that, due to weapons development, threatened to become even bloodier than the previous war.<sup>14</sup>

Edward VIII also seems to have tried to broker peace before everything was too late, but, like Gustaf, has afterwards been accused of pursuing Nazi affairs. Everyone was looking for blood, and they got it. (Lownie 2021.)

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here was an expectation that the Nordic solidarity pact meant that Sweden would assist Finland during the Winter War against the Soviet Union November 30, 1939, to March 13, 1940. However the assistance was limited to emergency aid & a volunteer corps. This government decision was unpopular in broad circles, but the opposition ended when Gustaf

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<sup>11</sup> Torbacke 1971: s. 53; Thorsell 2006: s. 38. [Felix Hamrins dagbok, 1933-05-05.]

<sup>12</sup> Thorsell 2006: s. 36. [Okänd källa. Upptecknat 1942-05-21.]

<sup>13</sup> Thorsell 2006: ss. 100-106.

<sup>14</sup> Richardson 2007a: ss. 21-28; Richardson 2007b.

February 19 included in the cabinet minutes that he fully supported the government's decision.

The King's official approval] had an immediate unifying and reassuring effect that would prove important for Sweden's future claims for keeping neutral. For example, Prime Minister Hansson, who had initially been hesitant about the monarch's involvement, quickly realized his misjudgment: "Paid the king a visit and thanked him for his official approval." ... In a letter written shortly after the monarch's dictatorship, the influential [leader of the Nordic Freedom m Sigurd] Curman stated that the king had now "posed himself personally as a shield before P. A. Hansson".<sup>15</sup>

Gustav V also supported Hansson during the Midsummer crisis in 1941 (the decision to allow the transit of German troops to Finland by Swedish rail). Hansson, however, was this time so anxious to avoid taking any responsibility that he already during the presentation stated that everything was on Gustaf V's initiative. Thorsten Nothin recalled in his memoirs the curious fact that no one asked Per Albin Hansson about his own assessment of the situation, but all discussion was about what Gustaf V had said or not said. "Where they already at that point prepared to blame the king if the decision was criticized? That question can only be answered in the affirmative. For in the autumn they began to say that it was the king who forced the consent. And they turned a deaf ear to all that might give the matter another interpretation."<sup>16</sup>

Gustaf seems to have had nothing against Operation Barbarossa or the Finish Continuation War of June 25, 1941, to September 19, 1944. October 1941 he wrote a private letter to Hitler congratulating him on his decision to suppress the "Bolshevik scourge". In March 1944, however, he advised the Finns to make a separate peace with the Soviet Union. He was primarily a realist and politician. There were limits, however. He regarded the Soviet state as a murder regime and refused to have anything to do with its diplomatic envoy.<sup>17</sup>

Gustaf V's actions were interpreted by the Swedish Nazis as he being positive towards the movement, and Gustaf received two delegations in 1942 and 1943, which expressed their loyalty and reverence.<sup>18</sup> By that time, Gustaf V had already started to rethink his German policy. He had resisted the idea that the Germans, a European cultured people, would be able to murder their own citizens, but had to give in. Hard to influence the development though. His most concrete achievement was a telegram June 30, 1944, to the Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy, protesting his deportation of Jews to the German death camps:

"Having learned of the extraordinarily harsh methods which your government has adopted towards the Jewish population of Hungary, I will take the liberty of addressing your Highness personally in the name of mankind to ask you to take action to save those who remain to be saved of this unfortunate people. This appeal has been prompted by my old feelings of friendship for your country and by my sincere concern for Hungary's good name and reputation in the community of nations."<sup>19</sup>

Other groups also protested and the deportations were cancelled. The Jews who had foreign citizenship or protective passports were allowed to leave the country. This is where Raoul

<sup>15</sup> Jönsson 2007: ss. 161-162.

<sup>16</sup> Nothin 1966: s. 402.

<sup>17</sup> Bernadotte 1983: ss. 95-96.

<sup>18</sup> Aftonbladet, 1942-11-25, s. 6; Norrskensflamman, 1942-11-23, s.5; Norrskensflamman, 1943-04-05, s. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Judisk tidskrift 1944, årg. 17, ss. 244 & 281.

Wallenberg's efforts were made. After the war Gustaf V would have been able to make his position clear by visiting e.g. Auschwitz, but he never did. Yet another allegation was that he in 1940 tried to persuade the newspaper editor Torgny Segerstedt not to provoke the Germans before Sweden had time to build up its defence, but Segerstedt declined.

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### Heir Prince Gustaf Adolf (Edmund)

Rumours of Edmund's Nazi sympathies began June 16, 1932, when his engagement to Sibylle and his father-in-law's Nazi sympathies became known. Edmund & Ingrid were in Coburg during the summer, and July 14, Edmund demonstrated his bad political judgment by attending a Stalhelm parade through the city, probably as a gesture of courtesy to his future father-in-law who held a leading position within Stalhelm, a veteran association with strong ties to the Nazi Party. Stalhelm & the local Nazis were also to form the honorary guard at the wedding, which caused Gustav V to abstain.<sup>20</sup> The photographs of the wedding on October 19 & 20 was full of swastikas & uniformed people. Hitler had been in Coburg in the days before to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the victory in the street battles there. The mayor, Franz Schwede, who performed the civil marriage ceremony was a Nazi.

From 1936 & 1939 there are several newspaper articles that Edmund & Sibylle met Hitler & Göring during Edmund's German equestrian competitions. They were also invited to Göring's newly built property Karinhall outside Berlin. There are four photographs from Edmund's representation. One where he shakes hands with Hitler.

There are also three incidents during the war:

- August 11, 1941, Edmund & the German consul in Malmö attended the inauguration of a memorial stone for the German sailors who had died at Östby-sänkningarna. Edmund gave a short speech praising the German sailors for their courage and willingness to sacrifice their lives. (During German transit to Finland, the Engelbrekt division transported its equipment by sea, but one of the ships hit a Swedish mine.)
- September/October 1941, Edmund together with a group of Swedish officers led by Major General Folke Högberg made a study trip to the Finnish-Russian front. Edmund visited Petroskoy a bit into Karelia shortly after the city had been retaken and then continued to Kontupohja a bit north.<sup>21</sup> He also visited the Swedish volunteers at the Hangö Front. Two weeks later, a Swedish LO delegation visited the same place: "Lieutenant-Colonel [Hans Berggren] told me that Prince Gustav Adolf had visited the squad two weeks earlier and that there had been a nasty incident. Only 40 meters outside the corner of the house exploded a shell from the Russian artillery. ... The prince with [his] military training at once took shelter behind a rock."<sup>22</sup> It has been alleged that Edmund at this occasion or the summer of 1943 also visited the Germans who were encamped not far away, but that has not been possible to verify.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Alm 2010.

<sup>21</sup> Mannerheim, 1951.

<sup>22</sup> Casparsson, 1963: s. 98.

<sup>23</sup> Westerlund & Immonen, 1999: s. 59; "Lawrence". Finska frågor 1: 17:e divisionen. <skalman.nu> (2009-09-28).



- March 17, 1942, Edmund handed over the Great Cross of the Order of Swords to the Communists special objects of hatred, Marshal Gustav Mannerheim.

Arbetartidningen, newspaper of the Moscow loyal Swedish Communist Party, alluded to the incidents in a number 1942-11-19: "The heir prince Gustaf Adolf, among the people more familiar as the Nazi-prince, has left his intimate intercourse with the German leaders and the field marshal Mannerheim to honour our city [Gothenburg] ... and popularize the Swedish royal Nazis ... the Nazi-prince & his German wife."<sup>24</sup> The article was discussed during a government meeting the following day, but was not taken seriously.<sup>25</sup> LO's press officer Ragnar Casparsson (of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation) later met Edmund at a press conference, had a long talk with him & got a totally different impression.<sup>26</sup> Sibylle received hate letters about her German background & family, but not about any Nazi sympathies. It is also often mentioned that the chairman of SSU (the Social Democratic Youth Organization) Bertil Johansson, at the party congress in 1944, spoke negatively about especially Edmund: "That the next man in the succession, we may well have to bear, but then comes a person who may never become king." After Edmund's death, it was the lid on, but as recently as 1982, rumours circulated in Republican circles about his pro-German nature. It would even have been the reason why P.A. Hansson supported the German transit of troops to Finland because he did not want to risk that Gustaf V & the Crown Prince both abdicated and handed Edmund the throne.<sup>27</sup>

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The summer of 1993, King Carl Gustaf organized an exhibition about his father. January 2, 1994, he was interviewed by SVT and portrayed Edmund as a good family man, interested in sports and with a traditional officer training. The program was afterwards criticized by journalist Annette Kullenberg for not touching on the rumours of Edmund's Nazi sympathies.<sup>28</sup> Carl Gustaf asked the head of the Bernadotte family archive to check whether there were any documents that proved the case but none appear to have been found.

No regular biography was published until 2006.<sup>29</sup> The biography showed that Edmund was German-friendly and during his missions to Germany met several high-ranking Nazis. Perhaps not so much to come up with, but the final judgment was still quite blunt:

"And the heir apparent Gustaf Adolf, the king's father, was he a Nazi? The question has been asked incorrectly. Gustaf Adolf was not a conscious political person. He was a grumpy and inhibited career officer from the Swedish upper class with for his background and time typical approaches, preferences and prejudices. He was raised in an environment where authoritarian arrogance, reactionary resentment and conservative prejudices were mandatory. An unreflective admiration for everything German was included in the basic mental equipment. In the Prince's case, the Germanophilic inclinations were reinforced by his marriage to Princess Sibylle. As a member of one of Germany's most Hitler-friendly houses, the prince was probably fed Nazi propaganda and as a good son-in-law he probably swallowed most of it."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Nazistprinsen hit med tysk fru. Arbetartidningen, 1942-11-19.

<sup>25</sup> Westman 1981: s. 212.

<sup>26</sup> Ehrensvärd 1965: s. 192. [Okänt datum. Omkring 1941/42.]

<sup>27</sup> Sjöberg & Åsard 1982: s. 106.

<sup>28</sup> Kullenberg 1995: ss. 203-215.

<sup>29</sup> Svensson 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Svensson 2010: ss. 121-122.

The author rather surprisingly concludes his accusations with “But about this we really know nothing. Prince Gustaf Adolf was not a writing and speaking person.”

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### Princess Sibylle of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha

During the war, Crown Princess Louise and Sibylle shared the representation. Louise visited the Allies. Sibylle visited the Germans. It was an unfortunate decision that had consequences for her reputation throughout her life. For example, in 1941 she attended the inauguration of the German School, a German book exhibition at the National Museum & during a visit to Haparanda she handed out gifts (cigarettes & chocolate) to German wounded soldiers. Her reputation did not get better by her during the war visiting Germany. On November 26, 1943, her brother Hubertus died on the Eastern Front. As he was a member of the Nazi Party, Sibylle's presence at the funeral could be constructed as a political statement, and so was done. Her father followed her back for a week as a diplomatic (=Nazi) envoy and after the collapse her brothers Johann Leopold and Friedrich fled to Sweden and were given (on extremely unclear grounds) a refuge with her.

Sibylle received anonymous hate letters naming her ”betrayers”, ”bloody German”, ”don't return” (to Gothenburg it seems) and unpleasant books about the German concentration camps. She responded with the lid on. Nothing was her fault. She was just a poor little mother of five children, a widow & princess in exile.<sup>31</sup> In fact, by her entire life pitying herself, she managed to escape criticism. Two biographies & a long interview with her daughter Christina has not in any way dispelled the fog about what she knew & felt.<sup>32</sup> However, it is clear that at the end of the war Sibylle still had feelings for Germany. The two oldest children took part in the victory celebrations inside Stockholm. She herself shut herself up in her room. As soon as possible, she visited Coburg incognito and stayed there for a few weeks, helping her parents who were barred from the castle. It became a habit. Her father died in 1954, her mother in 1970. It took until 1965 for her to publicly distance herself from her father's actions. “We all believed then that he [Adolf Hitler] would be able to help Germany get on its feet ... one let oneself be deceived by the dynamism of his appearance and was impressed that he created a kind of order out of chaos. You were bewitched, hypnotized, you didn't understand what was going on under the surface. Only from a distance could you see and think clearly, then you understood, then you came to your senses”.<sup>33</sup> It seems to have been under pressure. Queen Louise died in 1965 and Sibylle became first lady of the kingdom. As such, she could not defend a Nazi, even if he was her father.

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<sup>31</sup> Ebba Samuelsson. Prinsessan Sibylla. Svensk Damtidning, 1972:39.

<sup>32</sup> Lena Rainer. ”Sibylla – prinsessan på undantag”. Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 1997-11-02; Svensson 2006; Lundgren 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Margit Vinberg. Prinsessan Sibylla: Så är det att vara tittobjekt, symbol och fembarnsmamma. Vecko Journalen, 1965:30.

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