

Chapter 5 : Estates of the realm

The Bernadotte have always had a contradictory attitude to modernity. On the one hand, they have been pro-compromise and supported both liberal and social democratic reforms. On the other hand, they have allied themselves with various conservative groups and even perceived themselves as guarantors of a stable society & historical continuity. The assessment of the consequences of the vacillation has alternated between their pragmatic policy undermining their own existence (supposedly rooted in the Estates society), but their populism (the monarchy is whatever you want it to be) prolonging the death struggle.

The text below is about the Estates society 1809-1865, with emphasis on its "essence". Half of the chapter is about the climate of ideas. The other half about the political science defence of the Parliament of the Estates & the Swedish monarchy. The period is regarded as the birth of Swedish (monarchical) conservatism and many of its arguments are still with us.

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A. STATE PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE OF IDEAS

Feudal times

The historical judgment has been that until 1718 the Swedish combination of clan rule, autocracy and martial law was strangling the country, but that Sweden under the Bernadotte monarchy caught up.

- The Continental Middle Ages (476-1492) (=the fall of the Western Roman Empire until the discovery of America by Columbus; the feudal period) is usually subdivided into the Dark ages (800-1300) & the Renaissance (1300-1500). Early modern times (1492-1789) are usually subdivided into before & after the Enlightenment (1715-1789) (=From "the Sun King" Louis XIV's death until the French Revolution).
- The Swedish feudal period is traditionally considered to have covered the period (1280-1718) but should probably be extended to (1280-1865). There is no Swedish equivalent to the Renaissance, but the Swedish equivalent of the Enlightenment then covers the period (1718-1865).
- Concerning industrialization, Britain's industrial revolution began around 1760; The Swedish equivalent 100 years later. The continental lead was not closed until the "record years" (1946-1974).

As regards feudal times, there have been many suggestions as to how define it. In the 18th century, the feudal state was synonymous with autocracy. In the 19th century, the concepts of feudal relation (= personal loyalty; mutual privileges & obligations); feudal mode of production (=latifundia with slaves or serfs) & the existence of a courteous "knight culture". During the 20th century, the concept of feudal society was introduced (= interdependence between the Estates of the realm & a common world view; i.e. the parties accepted each other's specificity).

During the interwar period, the Swedish feudal state was a politically charged subject: The right-wing position was that Sweden under the autocracy was a feudal state, because the

autocracy was imposed with the support of the peasants, not by suppression.¹ The left-wing position was that the Swedish feudal state in common with as the continent was based on peasant oppression.² (See also chapter 7.)

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The "corporate patriarchy" of the estate society

The historian Lars Petterson summarizes the state of knowledge about the period 1809-1865 as the political climate of ideas being under-explored:

"Before 1865, when the national parliamentary representation was introduced, the government was essentially a royal administration which had to take into account the estates intermediate role in the feudal dualism between rex [king] and regnum [kingdom]. Historically oriented research into political ideas has mostly made light of the patriarchal heritage. The "historical school's" conceptions of a legal order based on common law and the Gothic idealization of feudal cultural norms has been discussed by Gunnar Heckscher (1939), but the importance of patriarchal ideology in the 19th century has been seriously neglected. ... Probably the researchers have considered that the collective structures of pre-capitalist character had by then been replaced by modernity, but in reality the corporative patriarchal structures remained in place until 1866 and after. ... The memory of a patriarchal past was a powerful source of inspiration for many politicians in the later half of the 19th century: the loss of the community of households and corporations, the active destruction of societal bonds – a dissolution that the guardians of tradition saw as an attempt to "grind the masses into atoms", which threatened to lead to "conflict", as Nils Fredrik Biberg wrote in an influential essay in 1823. Patriarchy had for centuries been infinitely more than an empty word, it was not "just" a confirmatory element of ideology, it was part of what the Marxists called the "base", and referred to a sociological reality: the patriarchal relations of personal dependence, subordination and reciprocity forming the structure of the feudal mode of production. ... "The true State exists only as a corporative entity" Atterbom wrote in 1835. "Only in a corporate social constitution does an organic and free state life express itself; the others are vain attempts, to unite a atomistic diversity through mechanical centralization."³

The contemporary debate is hard to penetrate. The historian Anders Fryxell (1795-1881) has criticized it as a philosophical Potemkin facade that concealed more than it explained. In his interpretation, the patriarchal debate was about a conflict of interests between nobility and farm workers, rather than about the state's soul, heart, nature or whatever.⁴

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Modernity

Modernity, as discussed here, is a form of social and norm dissolution in the wake of the Enlightenment & the French Revolution. The "corporate patriarchy" of the estate

¹ Boëthius 1916: ss. 88-97; Boëthius 1938.

² Strindberg 1937.

³ Petterson 1993: ss. 21-22.

⁴ Fryxell: dagbok 1828-12-28. I: Petterson 1993: s. 24.

society is set against the individualism of the Enlightenment. The classic in the field is Friedrich Hegel's (1807) *Phänomenologie des Geistes* which contains an episode "Lord-Slav" about "feudal social and cultural psychology" whose point is that the lord becomes lord & the slave slave only when the two agree on it. But once they agree (however it came to pass), their relationship is not maintained by violence, but through conviction. The original episode is so difficult to unravel, however, that I base myself on later summaries, on empirical social research & on how the message was perceived by contemporaries.⁵

The "corporate patriarchy" of the estates society is now a byword, but not before. As I write in chapter 1: "The estates society is usually discussed in terms of superiority & subordination, but seems by those living in it not to have been perceived in that way. All had their necessary social roles." - The "enlightenment project", however, consisted of grinding this society into dust. Hegel himself seems to have equated the corporations-social roles-hierarchies which he identified through the paired opposites of thesis-antithesis. He envisioned (or supposedly envisioned) modernity as a constantly ongoing process of change: thesis + antithesis → synthesis. I illustrate it with some of the opposites of the debate: Lord-slave, King-subject, noble-citizen, Swedish-foreigner, upper & lower class, monarchy-republic, officer-soldier, bureaucrat-practitioner, priest-lay, expert-amateur, employer-employee, teacher-pupil, man-woman, child-adult, self-others and further social relations of real or imagined superiority & subordination. Nothing is a given.

The enlightenment project was not to patch up an existing structure, such was still system preservation, but to clean up the house. No one was worth more than the other. However, the consequences were unclear. The thesis + antithesis → synthesis reasoning suggested that it could pull away in any direction, which it did. Modernity fulfilled all conservative fears that the effect of the enlightenment (and democracy) was total anarchy where each was himself closest. Society was in danger of imploding in everyone's fight against everyone else. Not even the fittest could survive that.

The Marxist Hegel interpretation was less apocalyptic, but more deterministic: Industrial division of labour - an ongoing fragmentation of the labour market & professional roles - broke social relations & left each person to himself & his closest. In Sweden, however, it was not until after 1865 that this effect became noticeable.

In the 20th century, the consequences of modernity as a secular religion became (over)clear to everyone. The First World War broke up the old hegemony. World War II broke up modernism (=Nazism, Fascism & Communism). After the end of the war, the ideologies of the 20th century were declared obsolete, socially dangerous, defeated & thank God dead. 19th century parliamentary democracy had a comeback.⁶

My own interpretation is rather that modernism is a driver of democracy because it eventually makes it impossible to assemble a large enough group with the same interests. Modern autocracies try through intensive propaganda to postpone the inevitable. It works as long as the countryside is underdeveloped & keeps to the old ways. In Sweden, according to V-Dem 2022 the world's most democratic country, it is highly doubtful if you can still find two people with the same interests in life.

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⁵ Pleijel 1987; Petterson 1993: ss. 20-24; Manning Delaney & Wallenstein 2008.

⁶ Tingsten 1964.

*What you can not say clearly, you do not know;
words are borne by thought;
what dimly said is dimly thought.*
Esaias Tegnér (1820)

B. ORGANIC STATE THEORY

The 19th century organic political science was in much a reaction to the 18th century belief that states can be governed by reason & has been difficult for posterity to embrace. It is available in three variants: an early form based on metaphysics (pure political science), a transitional form based on psychology (political sociology), and a later form based on biology (a system-theoretical approach). The study object was "the corporate state". The ideas were often more important than the empirical test. Quite natural considering the ontology.

The Uppsala ultraists

In Sweden, the organic political science had an academic life beginning with the historian Erik Gustaf Geijer (1783-1847) and ending with the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922). In between was a group of philosophers with Nils Fredrik Biberg (1776-1827), Samuel Grubbe (1786-1853), Per Daniel Amadeus Atterbom (1790-1855) and Christopher Jacob Boström (1797-1866) as most renowned. The group also included the official, politician etc. Hans Hjärta (1774-1847), best known for his work on the 1809 form of government. The lot were also influenced by the natural philosopher Friedrich von Schelling, which ensured an almost incomprehensible presentation of their ideas (see chapter 14).

The ultraist's chief opponent was the historian Anders Fryxell (1795-1881) who named them after their French counterpart. I exemplify the Swedish debate with Geijer, Hjärta & Boström who all defended the principles of the Swedish organic society (=a stable social order):

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Geijer as a political philosopher

Geijer is presented in the Swedish Wikipedia as a Swedish polymath: both scientist, author, poet, philosopher, historian & composer. Foreign Wikipedia is more reserved: Geijer was well-read, but never completed his historical projects. His philosophy was German loan goods applied to Swedish conditions. As a philosopher, his most important contributions were the essays "Feudalism and Republicanism. A contribution to the history of the constitution." (1818) & "New things about the academic jurisdiction." (1823):

[The paper of 1818 is supposed to have been written to defend Charles John against criticism levelled at him during the Vienna Congress 1814-15 and later that he lacked legitimacy. The 1809 form of government was based on the Enlightenment's state conception of natural law and a social contract. The Vienna Congress, however, favoured the organic state conception of the German National Romanticism that when the ruler could no longer legitimize his position through religion, he would instead legitimize himself through his feudal ancestry (=history & tradition). The

revolutionary general Jean Bernadotte did not have any such, but Geijer formulated a compromise, which has since been given the status of the birth of Swedish (old) conservatism.]

Geijer's argument is notoriously involved. I hand the interpretation to Torgny Segerstedt:

”In 1818 Geijer published his magnum opus *Feudalism and Republicanism*. The dissertation may be perceived as an attempt to reconcile the organic state view with the choice of a new royal dynasty. Feudalism is based on the principle of the organic state. According to Geijer, on the natural power structure of the family. The father decides on behalf of the members. Power is not regulated by laws or custom, but by mutual emotions. Power comes from above and is directed downwards. Of course, this power structure develops and becomes more complicated when the family becomes a clan and the clan a nation. The republican principle also derives from the family, but in this case, the historical development means that the various family heads, in order to create security, enter into a common agreement, according to the will of the members. In this case, power comes from below and is delegated upwards. According to the Republican principle, society is ”a union between equals.” What Geijer emphasized was that the organic society did not exclude an agreement-based legislation and a transfer of power from the people [burghers, peasants]. In this way it could be argued that Charles John too had a legitimate right to the throne.”⁷

”Geijer's aim is to find a synthesis between feudalism [=nobility, priests] as thesis and republicanism [=burghers, peasants] as antithesis. The four estates must coexist in one society, the two historically given systems and schools should ”influence” each other. The power that unites the two different traditions is the king. ... His idea would have been that the feudal and republican system [certainly differed, but] had the king as a common denominator. In one case it was an inherited kingdom, in the other the king was elected. But with the unanimous vote ... he became the representative of the state. [Charles John was not an usurper.] His road to the throne had a deep historical foundation within the republican system, which was basically the original Nordic system.”⁸

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Geijer as political scientist

The difficulty of interpreting *Feudalism and Republicanism* is largely due to omissions: lack of supporting data & sources. The Marxist etc. Per Meurling (1906-1984) and others, however, felt able to trace an influence of the obscurantist political scientist Adam Müller von Nitterdorf (1779-1829):

”[Adam Müller resembles] the state with a canon ball, seamlessly cast with the monarchy at its centre and consisting of two hemispheres, feudalism and the republic, nobility and the bourgeoisie, two contradictions, which mutually conditioned each other and in different guises could be found in all states. Geijer now adopted this ”kugeltheori”, in places even with the same choice of words. ... The attempt during the French Revolution to eliminate the centre of the Kugel, the monarchy, and the ”feudal

⁷ Segerstedt 1986a: s. 164.

⁸ Segerstedt 1986a: s. 192.

hemisphere” had failed. ... A state could not exist without both of its elements, constantly striving for ”equalization”, then in one direction, then in the other. [=The natural condition of the state was with the monarch in the centre to oscillate between extremes. Nothing was ever stable.]

...

[There was much] in Adam Müller's idealization of feudalism, which directly appealed to Geijer, including royalism, the highlighting of personality and the distinction Adam Müller made between a society that was only dead administrative mechanics and that which was a living organism. However, his general sympathies with Republicanism shine through. Particularly marked are the differences in Adam Müller's and Geijer's political views on the peasant estate. For the former, the farmer was more a thing [or inventory] than a living being ... For the latter he was a cornerstone of his political view, that the Swedish farmer never like the German had been a serf but free and self-reliant as the yeoman of poetry.”⁹

An alternative interpretation is that Geijer alluded to the functional view of the four estates of the era: Although there was a hierarchy of king-nobility-priests-burghers-peasants, each estate fulfilled a task. The community was like a multi-story building with the farmers at the bottom, the king at the top & the edifice remaining stable by grace of monarchy. Remove it and the building collapsed.¹⁰

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Geijer as a politician

Arriving at the future right-wing leader Gunnar Heckscher (1939) the historically distinctive character of the Swedish monarchy, feudal or republican, was no longer an issue. Heckscher was more sensitive to Swedish conservatism in the spirit of Edmund Burke, with King and Parliament on equal footing. In his Geijer analysis he points out that: Geijer believed that the nobility was part of the people, not an independent feudal power on equal footing with the people and their king. Through its social position, upbringing & education, the nobility was, however, especially suited to public service and in that capacity could fulfil a role as ”intermediary power” between the King & the people. Unlike Burke, Geijer thus advocated a hierarchy: king-nobility|elite-others.¹¹

There has been much talk of Geijer's ”liberal defection” during the Parliament of 1838, when he supported several liberal projects, even advocating English parliamentarianism. He himself wanted to tone down the abrupt in the ”defection” and spoke rather of a long reorientation from the Gothic - ”Sweden's history is its kings” - via ”historicism” - that tradition and zeitgeist govern the living - to a greater belief that the living control their own destiny. Fryxell's explanation seems less far-fetched: Geijer supported Oscar I's idea of a bourgeois monarchy now that the nobility was losing its influence.¹²

Since Geijer's philosophy of state changed constantly, it is difficult to generalize. However, it seems to me that it had great similarities with ”Boströmianism” below:

⁹ Meurling 1983: ss. 177-179.

¹⁰ Stadin 2004: ”Den svenska fyrståndsläran”.

¹¹ Heckscher 1943: ss. 112-165

¹² Kjellén 1943.

That the state was by its nature an apolitical administrative apparatus, where the king worked for the good of all. Not as innocent as it sounds. The king was the guarantor of status quo.

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The Royal mandate

When Hjärta resigned as governor in 1823 he started publishing the magazine *Odalmannen*. The same year he introduced two articles, *On Statistics* and *On General Rescue Institutions*. One of the intentions of the two articles was to show the absurdity of the natural law theories of a social treaty. The theory was not only historically unreasonable, but also dangerous if one wanted to derive principles of legislation from it. ... The state developed gradually and organically, state and society are therefore not the result of a conscious decision. The people already exist when they accept a constitution. Nothing ever starts from scratch. If you read the memorandum from 1809, it says that it is the people who hand over power to a ruler. The state had not been dissolved by the coup d'état; it had not returned to a state of nature. Thus, there was only room for a ruling treaty [to manage society according to an agreement, not a social treaty to change it at will].¹³

The original article is more pointed: The "state-economic materialism" of the Age of Liberty had once again put its dead hand over the national government. This people of honour and heroes were led by a poor in spirit corporal soul & statistics nerd. Before, the king was loved and revered. Now he was just an accountant. After all, the state was something different & higher than its budget. It was the heart of the country.

Charles John objected through his cultural "spokesperson" P A Wallmark, that his position should rather be interpreted as an example of Hobbes, Lockes & Montesquieu's contract theory. I.e. was a social contract with reciprocal rights & obligations.¹⁴

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"Boströmianism"

Boström's Hegel-inspired political science was a siding in his production, it was not published until 1859, but he lectured on the subject. These lectures gained a great influence by the fact that in all studies except the medical was included an initial course in philosophy that Boström for many years led & examined. The philosophy of state was as follows:

According to liberal ideology, the state was the people. According to Boström's theory of state, the state and the people were two separate entities. Accordingly, he distinguished between public and private interests. State interests (=public interests) were defined by the constitution. Private interests (=special interests) was everything else. The special interests of the people were represented through their associations (estates, guilds, professions). Corporative politicians could only pursue special interests, not common interests. In particular, this concerned constitutional matters because the state was by definition both immutable and impartial (=sanctioned by God). In practice, this meant that:

¹³ Segerstedt 1986a: ss. 164-165.

¹⁴ Wallmark 1823.

1. The King (as the trustee of the state) was the highest official of the country.
2. The government (as officials under the king) were the representatives of the king, not the people.
3. All government officials (including King & Government) were impartial.
4. And that even the corporative politicians were a kind of impartial officials because their scope was limited to the special interests of their own corporation.
5. Foreign policy (a common interest) was the responsibility of the king.

Boström's philosophy led him to support the Estate based Parliament as a better alternative than the two-chamber Parliament which he believed was based on pure self-interest and therefore contributed to the disintegration of society. Symbolically, he died during the last Parliament of the Estates in 1865/66.¹⁵

Because so much of Boström's political science was communicated during the lectures and in no other way there is some confusion about what it meant in practice. The historian of ideas Svante Nordin interprets it as:

”His essential idea [was] that the monarch is the representative of the idea of the state and thus in his activities determined by the laws that inhabit this idea. The real ideal of Boström is about a constitutional monarchy where the king rules according to the laws and does not violate the individual's legal freedom. In a way, the king is only the highest bureaucrat, his task is to carefully interpret and apply the law. Boström is more the apologist of the official state than the absolute monarchy. The bourgeois elements of his ideal of state are more important than the feudal ones. ... As Tingsten rightly points out, the most important ideological element of Boström was inherent in his idealism. What is crucial is the division of reality into the apparent and the real. The bicameral parliament according to Boström is not a real representation, a republic not a real state, etc.”¹⁶

In Nordin's final words, however, ”Boströmianism” is not as odd as Tingsten depicted it, but a correct description of Sweden's political condition 1809 - c. 1880:

”Boströmianism functions [until the turn of the century] as a semi-official, though never undisputed, philosophical ideology that for a few decades dominated a special constellation of social, political and cultural forces. The official Sweden, the ruling state, consisted of officials, often with a background in nobility and land ownership. Their political creed is a kind of administrative ideology. Politics becomes a matter of good administration, not ideologies or partisan interests. The King had the power to rule the country precisely because he was above class and party interests and could only rule in the interests of the nation. The officials - including ministers and secretaries of state - are conscientious executors of the King's decisions and thus the guardians of the interests of state. Their main virtues are sound judgment and incorruptibility. They are trustees, not politicians. In this concept, ideas of development and change do not play an essential role. The king presides over the hierarchies and estates where each man occupies the position accorded to him by his birthright. Over the King God as the ultimate guarantor of social order.

¹⁵ Boström 1883: del 2, ss. 311-410 & del 3, ss. 157-163.

¹⁶ Nordin 1981: s. 30.

The majority of the population, the governed, were rural. Religion remained their dominant ideology and the priests the university-educated superiors with whom they came closest in contact. Neither ideologically nor politically did this people offer any challenge to the existing regime. The rural population, represented mainly by the subsistence farmers, demanded to have their complaints heard and their immediate interests to some extent met. But not about becoming rulers themselves. They were peasants, not masters and intended to remain so. No ministers were recruited from the peasants, and no demands were made for this to happen. The role Boström attributed to the popular representation was to a large extent the role they actually had, even after the bicameral reform had taken place.

It is only ostensibly paradoxical that Boström's philosophy, rooted in the old civil society, could survive the 1866 reform of representation. The paradox is largely explained by the fact that the reform was carried out in the spirit of the compromise. De Geer was forced to win the nobility's approval by great concessions, mainly at the expense of the middle class. Decades after the reform, the middle class shared power with older social strata, and there was no possibility of any radical bourgeois ideology becoming dominant. In the 1860s, Swedish society was also too backwards for the conditions of a more radical reform to exist. In the long run, however, De Geer's reform gave the middle class what it was promised."¹⁷

When the future right-wing leader Gunnar Heckscher 1939-43 published his studies on the development of Swedish conservatism, the verdict over Boström was harsh:

"With Boström and his school, "the Swedish line" ends in the state philosophy of conservatism. Biberg's and Grubbe's eclecticism could possibly have been the seed for further discussion of new problems, even for direct political ideology. The adamant dogmatic nature of Boström and his disciples' teachings and the "systems" tendency to completely avoid all problems prevented such a development. As political publicists, such philosophers could still show great talent and exercise a not insignificant influence, but any development of ideology or any adaptation to the rapidly changing problems in the Sweden of reorganized agriculture and the nascent industrialism they could not achieve. Boström's philosophy, on the contrary, was, in terms both of the constitutional separation of powers and of the issue of representation, to positions that the leading men of the Conservative Party - as is shown below - had already, decades before the reform, found untenable. Boström was also sometimes cited by conservative politicians, not only by liberals who sought to paint a certain potentate [the devil] on the wall. But his importance in practical politics was virtually non-existent - if we do not count on the effort that he gave his system such a dogmatic character that it became useless for any political opinion. With him, in fact, Swedish conservatism lost its opportunity for state philosophical extension."¹⁸

Nobody now defends Boström's theory of state, but his official philosophy is part of the contemporary Swedish state's self-image. Carl Gustaf, for example, sees himself as an official rather than as an independent regent. Boström's political philosophy also seems to affect the standards of today's "ideal politicians" who are not supposed at all times to pursue the special interests of their electorate but also consider the country's best interests.

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¹⁷ Nordin 1981: ss. 203-204.

¹⁸ Heckscher 1943: s. 88.

The latest development is that 'Boström' has been given the status of socially dangerous ideology. State scientist Olof Petersson has included him as an example of anti-democratic "centralism":

"The glorification of the state also occurs in other political ideologies [than Marxism-Leninism]. Swedish public life in the 19th century was dominated by the state idealism that had been developed by the conservative philosopher Christopher Jacob Boström (1797-1866). Boström's enemy was liberalism with its view of individuals entering into voluntary contracts. For Boström, the state was somewhat higher, which was instituted in heaven. The idea of the state trumped the individuals. People were pawns under the law. Sovereignty did not come from below, but from above, but from the idea of the state and ultimately from God. The state was one and indivisible and represented by a single person, the monarch."¹⁹

Boström's criticism referred to the state as a political arena. In the liberal state, everything is negotiable. In 1918, the civil service appeared to have experienced the "change of system" as a threat to the entire legal community. They would no longer be impartial in the exercise of their professional duties (=act according to the law), but take political considerations (=be corrupt by design).

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C. SOCIAL DISOLUTION

Security

There are many claims that the Bernadotte are perceived as guarantors of the Swedes' safe existence. What is often meant is that the constitutional monarchy of the 19th century was perceived as an acceptable middle way between the anarchy of the French Revolution and the Russian autocracy. In the 20th century, the Social Democrats launched themselves in a similar way, as a middle way between Russian communism and American capitalism. There are also claims that the patriarchal traditions of the monarchy were a factor of security, and that the royal family was perceived as part of their own family. The conservative "People's home" ideology has some similarities with the social democratic variant.

However, the more concrete interpretation of security is social stability, which during the last decades of the estates society meant economic stagnation. In anticipation of industrialization, politics was put to pasture.

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Anomie

Anomie (alienation; dissolution; "everything is unrecognizable") is a term introduced by the sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) to describe the effect of rapid societal changes. One such Swedish change was the partition reforms and the dissolution of the village community. There are provincial medical reports beginning in the 1860s (?) of an increased incidence of depression & that people sought refuge at the church not for religious reasons, but for spiritual

¹⁹ Petersson 2015: s. 43.

support. It has been suggested that the free churches, popular movements and even the new "Swedishness" contributed to giving their lives new meaning. They became part of an enlarged community, which is said to have been the most important contribution of nationalism.

The Republican credo of the labour movement seems a little odd in this context. After all, the industrial workers were former peasants of the 1st or 2nd generation, and in that capacity at least they should have been loyal to the monarchy. Many, however, were obviously bitter about their proletarianization and felt abandoned by God, the king and society in general. After 1918, however, they were grateful for their newfound rights, which apparently many regarded as a gift from King Gustaf V to the people. (See chapter 13)

The anomie also affected the nobility, who in the 19th century lost both their privileges and their social role. There is anecdotal information about an increased incidence of depression & irrational behaviour. Many seem to have blamed the royal house for their fate. King Oscar II is said to have been uniquely unpopular with nobles in particular. (See chapter 12)

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